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I. INTRODUCTION

The Internet has often been hailed as an equalizer of social, political,
and economic power. A voice on the Internet can be as loud as any other,
provided one has the requisite technological skills or the ability to acquire
them. This nature of the Internet has meant that small groups of students
have formed million dollar companies, single political activists have had
their voices heard by thousands, and that anyone who publishes on the
Internet has a potential audience of billions.
Yet there is a powerful and quick-moving trend threatening to
undermine these qualities of the Internet. Not surprisingly, it is led by
corporate monoliths who are particularly accustomed to a world unlike the
Internet - where money and power are tantamount to the loudness of
one's voice.
This Article focuses on the area of law surrounding domain name
disputes. This area of law is predominantly based in trademark and there
has been much said about the intersection of trademark and "name law,"
which I define as inclusive of law dealing with domain names, keywords,
meta-tags, and other uses of names or short phrases to identify locations
on the Internet.
Indeed, there have been more than a few powerful criticisms about the
awkward nature of trademark law and name law. But the analyses thus far
have existed alongside a statutory and common law landscape that refuses
to admit its shortcomings. Overreaching laws have been passed, unwise
judicial opinions have been handed down, and non-legal bodies playing a
part in name disputes have created a system so devoid of relation to any
respected legal principles that it boggles the mind.
With the expansion of "name law" on several fronts - legislative,
judicial, and in dispute resolution policies mandated by the nonprofit body
in charge of the .com, .net, and .org domain names' - it is fitting to ask
whether the changes being made have gone too far. As noted, there have
I. The Internet Corp. for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN).
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already been several critiques of the application by various parties of
trademark law to the name law context. But no critique has focused
intensively on the keystone 2 of trademark infringement: consumer
confusion. Virtually any reading of the history of trademark law will show
that the core principle behind it is the protection of consumers against
confusion in the marketplace. Moreover, newer trademark legislation like
the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act3 (ACPA) as well as the
private rule systems like the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy4 (UDRP)
ostensibly incorporate the Lanham Act's policy against consumer
confusion. Yet to actually delve into decisions in domain name litigation
and UDRP proceedings is to wonder whether anyone is more confused
than the judges and tribunals that make these determinations.
Here, I argue that the motivation ofpreventing consumer confusion, the
central component of trademark law, has been killed in modem Internet
name law litigation and dispute resolution. This result, in addition to the
systematic deterioration of the required showings for trademark dilution,
has left trademark law in domain name disputes a battered corpse of a
doctrine with little predictability, fairness, or congruity with traditional
underpinnings of trademark law.
The first part of this Article provides an introduction to the technical
issues and terminology relevant to domain name disputes. The second part
of this Article will be devoted to showing how and why consumer
confusion is being ignored instead of serving as the centerpiece of
trademark infringement litigation in the Internet name context. Included
in this second part will be a look at the UDRP and its failings as an attempt
to resonate with any accuracy the principles of trademark law, as well as
the newer concept of "initial interest" confusion appearing in a number of
domain name disputes. The third part of this Article will focus on the
implications of such wholesale degradation of trademark law. The fourth
and final part of this Article will suggest modifications to existing laws
and dispute resolution policies, the systems that render decisions on those
policies, and the application of rules within those policies.
II.

THE INTERNET AND THE DOMAIN NAME SYSTEM

The Internet is a worldwide computer network wherein devices
communicate with each other using a standardized protocol known as
2. 1 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETION § 2:8 (4th ed.).
3. 15 U.S.C. 1125(d)(l)(A) (2001).
4. The UDRP is the mandatory policy regarding domain name disputes that was adopted
by ICANN. All registrants of domain names after the adoption of the UDRP must agree to its terms,
which include submission to a dispute resolution process in certain circumstances. See ICANN
Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy, availableat http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp.
htm (last visited Dec. 19, 2001).
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TCP/IP.' The modem Internet is a distant but faithful version of the
original network from which it was derived, namely the Advanced
Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET).6 The ARPANET, a
project of the Pentagon, called on the expertise of the RAND corporation
as well as several major research universities.' Soon, more and more
institutions and groups with computers desired to become part of the
growing network In 1984, the National Science Foundation created their
own network based on the TCP/IP protocols.' Shortly thereafter, other
federal government agencies became part of the growing network that
would eventually become the Intemet.'° Eventually, academic institutions
offered access to the Internet to their constituents and subsequently, public
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) allowed anyone to access the Internet.
The Internet is merely a substrate onto which programmers may plant
virtually any type of application they desire. Most users of the Internet
utilize many of these applications, such as the World Wide Web, email,
and Usenet newsgroups. Each of these Internet applications relies upon the
TCP/IP protocol, the same system of addressing that all of the Internet
employs." Each computer or device on the Internet is assigned an IP
number that serves as its unique address on the Internet - an Internet
street address, if you will. Computers are able to talk to other computers
on the Internet by sending messages into the network that include the
recipient computer's IP address. Because of the inherent difficulty in
remembering any more than a handful of these addresses or IP numbers,
the developers of the Internet created the idea of domain names, whereby
numeric IP addresses like 169.154.142.2 could be associated with easy to
remember alphanumeric character strings like BOBSCOMPUTER. 2 The
system of computers and software that translate IP numbers into easy to
remember names is called the Domain Name System (DNS). 3

5. Transmission Control Protocol and Internet Protocol.
6. See generally STEPHEN SEGALLER, NERDs 2.0.1: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE INTERNET
(T.V. Books 1998).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See generally T. Socolofsky & C. Kale, A TCP/IP Tutorial (RFC 1180), available at
http://sunsite.dk/RFC/rfc/rfcl 180.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2001) (explaining the basic structure
and operation of TCP/IP and the Internet); What Is The Internet?, available at http://whatis.
techtarget.com/definition/ 0,289893,sid9_.gci212370,00.html (last visited Dec. 19,2001) (providing
a simple explanation of how the Internet uses TCP/IP).
12. See generally M. Leiner et al., A Brief History of the Internet, availableat http://www.
isoc.org/intemet/history/brief.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2001) (explaining the impetus for various
developments in the creation of the Internet and its functions).
13. Id.
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Each top level domain (TLD) such as .COM, .EDU, or .NET, is
maintained by a registry. Until 1998, the sole registry of all generic TLDs,
such as .COM, .EDU, and .NET, as well as .ORG, was a company called
Network Solutions Incorporated (NSI).' 4 NSI had agreed to operate the
registries, as well as handle registration of domain names within those
registries, under a contract with the Department of Commerce." In
September of 1998, however, a nonprofit corporation, ICANN, was
formed and the Department of Commerce agreed to work with the new
corporation to relieve NSI of some of its duties. 6 The politics and
propriety of the transition to ICANN's power are well outside the scope of
this Article, but much can be found on the topic."
As ICANN began to assume formal control over the generic TLD
registries, it started to impose rules on those entities that wished to "sell"
domain names to the public (registrars), as well as those who purchased
the domain names (registrants). The long process of finding an appropriate
set of rules for registrars and registrants culminated in the adoption of the
Uniform Domain-Name Dispute Resolution Policy"8 (UDRP).' 9 Generally,
the UDRP requires anyone who registers a domain name to agree to
submit to a mandatory resolution proceeding, the terms of which are also
defined in the UDRP. 20 The mechanics of the UDRP are discussed later in
this Article.
Several other aspects of Internet technology are relevant here. One such
aspect is the way in which search engines operate to gather information
from the World Wide Web, often referenced in at least some capacity by
the information's Uniform Resource Locator (URL). A web page's URL
is a full address of that location on the Internet, such as http://www.
something.com/users/michael/page.html, which almost always
incorporates a domain name rather than the IP number of the root web
server from which it is served. The nature and import of this and other

14. See Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 FED. REG. 31,741 (Dep't of

Commerce June 10, 1998), available at http://www.icann.org/general/white-paper-05jun98.htm
(updated July 22, 2000) (also known as the "White Paper").
15. Id.
16. Id.

17. See http://www.icannwatch.com/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2001) (providing a plethora of
information from one group of ICANN pundits.
18. See http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2001).
19. See Timelinefor the Formulation and Implementation of the Uniform Domain-Name
Dispute-Resolution Policy, available at http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-schedule.html (last

updated Oct. 17, 2000).
20. See UDRP at 4, availableat http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp.htm (last visited Mar. 20,
2001).
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relevant technology characteristics will be discussed in later portions of
this Article. Until then, it is now appropriate to look at the legal mechanics
involved in domain name disputes.
III. CONFUSION

Under the F6deral Trademark Act of 1946, commonly known as the
Lanham Act,2 trademark infringement requires a showing that the
defendant has "use[d] in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy,
or colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with.. .goods or
services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive."22 To begin, a couple of
points should be observed about this language. First is that infringement
requires the mark in question to be used in commerce.23 This means that
the use of trademarks in noncommercial contexts is not prohibited.
Secondly, the Lanham Act requires a fairly strong showing of confusion
it must be likely that defendant's use will cause confusion.24
The first of these observations is worth noting because it is problematic
to some plaintiffs in domain name cases. In a classic "cybersquatting"
case,25 the defendant has registered a domain name incorporating only the
plaintiff's trademark.26 Further, the defendant has failed to use the domain
name in any way and has affirmatively attempted to sell it for a large sum
to the respective trademark holder." In such a case, it is not easy to see
how the defendant has used the trademark in commerce. Some courts
have held that the attempt to sell the domain name back to the plaintiff was
sufficient use in commerce to invoke the Lanham Act's infringement
provision,2" even though such a finding seems to stretch the common sense
meaning of the Lanham Act. Indeed, no confusion of consumers can occur
if there has been no commercial exposure, and if the only consumer who
has been exposed to commercial activity of the defendant is the plaintiff,
it is unclear what legally cognizable confusion has taken place. More
importantly, a finding that the defendant in a domain name case has used
a mark in commerce is typically unfair, given that many "cybersquatter"
cases are far from the prototypical case described above. Some plaintiffs

21. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127(2001).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a)(2001).
23. Id.

24.
25.
most.
26.
27.

Id.
By this, I mean a case that typifies the sorts of behavior that trademark owners detest
See, e.g., Panavision Int'l L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
Id.

28. Id.
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are the first party to suggest the sale of a domain.29 Many defendants make
active noncommercial use of their domains.3 ° Finally, the "commercial use
in commerce" requirement of trademark law should be noted for its
importance in making the Lanham Act a valid legislative exercise of
power under the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 31 As courts
begin to weaken the commercial use requirement, and as more defendants
in domain name disputes come from countries other than the United States,
serious constitutional problems begin to arise.32 For all of the foregoing
reasons, we should be wary of a path of interpretation that takes trademark
law into highly suspect territory.
The second of these observations is important as it helps to establish a
baseline of thought as to the level of confusion necessary to support an
infringement claim. Though the Lanham Act is silent as to whom must be
confused and when the requisite confusion must take place - these are
topics which have been covered by subsequent litigation - it is at least
clear that the plausibility or possibility of confusion is not enough. This
baseline is important to keep in mind, particularly in this area of rapidly
evolving and constantly changing technology where consumer knowledge
is both widely varied and quickly improving. Moreover, for domain names
that have not yet been utilized on the Internet in any way, -or where
evidence of "actual confusion"" is absent, the required confusion analyses
performed by courts and dispute resolution panelists are often
presumptuous in a way that must be evaluated in light of the strong
requirement of a likelihood of confusion.
With these two basic observations about the Lanham Act's
infringement provision in front of us, a look into the mechanics of
confusion in domain name cases is now appropriate. Confusion analysis
has never been an exact science. In the pursuit of producing a standardized
and facile test to detect consumer confusion, the Court of Appeals for the

29. See Strick Corp. v. Strickland, No. 00-3343 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 27, 2001); Biofield Corp. v.
Jaehyun Kwon, eResolution Case AF-0 102 (Mar. 23,2001), availableathttp://www.eresolution.ca/
services/dnd/decisions/0102.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2001).
30. See, e.g., Colonial Williamsburg Found. v. Rogers, Civ. A. No. 4:OOCV45 (E.D. Va. Apr.
20,2000), availableathttp://www.finn4egan.com/sumn/cases/williamsburg.htm (last visited Oct.
27, 2001) (granting preliminary injunction against use of domain name for purpose of hosting online discussion by union member employees of plaintiff).
31. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.

32. See generally Heather A. Forrest, Note, Drawing a Line in the ConstitutionalSand
Between Congress and the ForeignCitizen "Cybersquatter," 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 461

(2001).
33. Actual confusion is one type of evidence that can be used against an alleged infringer.

This factor is one of eight factors relevant to an analysis of consumer confusion as determined by
the Court in AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraf Boats, 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979).
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Ninth Circuit pronounced eight factors34 relevant, but not exclusive, to a
finding of a likelihood of confusion. These factors include: (1) strength of
the mark, (2) proximity of the goods, (3) similarity of the marks, (4)
evidence of actual confusion, (5) marketing channels used, (6) type of
goods and the degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser, (7)
defendant's intent in selecting the mark, and (8) likelihood of expansion
of the product lines (hereafter, Sleekcraft factors).
Clearly, some of the above factors are an odd fit in the domain name
context. From an objective point of view this situation could be interpreted
in a number of ways. For instance, one might posit that the alleged
inapplicability of most if not all of the above eight factors is simply
because there has been no infringement. A competing view, which has
been adopted by many courts and UDRP panelists, seems to assume that
infringement has taken place and that the alleged "cybersquatter" must be
pushed into purview of the eight factor test. A third interpretation is that
the eight factors do not and should not apply to the "cybersquatter" for
lack of efficaciousness - that if we wish to curtail "cybersquatting,"
trademark law in this instance is not the right way to do it. But what has
perhaps gone unnoticed is the similarity between the first and third views.
That is, if trademark law is a bad fit in the domain name context, then
perhaps it is both the case that many disputes do not evidence any
violation of trademark law and that this fact should inform our sense of
whether such disputes ought to trigger the sorts of protections 35 trademark
law provides.36 The question of which assessment is the proper one, in
light of a rigorous examination of trademark law, the Internet, and the
reasoning courts have employed in applying the former to the latter is the
focus of this Article. Thus, it is now appropriate to look at several contexts
in which confusion is a central concept: traditional likelihood of confusion
analysis under trademark law, the UDRP's confusion analysis, and the
relatively new doctrine of initial interest confusion that has been
increasingly important in Internet name cases.
A. TrademarkLaw
The eight part test from AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats,3 or some highly
similar alternative, is often applied systematically and sequentially by both
34. Id.
35. See Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death ofCommon Sense, 108
YALE L.J. 1687, 1688-94 (1999).
36. Such protections need not necessarily come from the Lanham Act. Many other areas of
law potentially provide protection of commercial marks, including unfair competition, copyright,
etc. Moreover, contracting may provide additional types of protection outside statutory law, as is
the case with the UDRP discussed herein, or in other contexts like franchising agreements.
37. 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979).
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trial and appeals courts.3" Thus, such a method is appropriate to examine
how these factors apply generally to the context of domain name cases in
which trademark infringement is alleged. Throughout such an analysis,
several things should be monitored: (1) the extent to which the Sleekcraft
factors are a good fit for domain name cases - that they are cognizable
and applicable; (2) the extent to which the Sleekcraft factors have merely
been ignored in the domain name context - why has this ignorance taken
place?; (3) to the extent that the Sleekcraft factors are either a bad fit for
the domain context or are justifiably ignored, what do such conclusions
say about the policy behind punishing the use of trademarks in domain
names, particularly in light of the policies behind the Lanham Act?;39 (4)
the success or failure of courts to comprehend the nature and
characteristics of the Internet, its users, and the lower-level technologies
underlying the operation of domain names, search engines, and other
relevant functions of the Internet.
1. Strength of the Mark
This factor of confusion is not so interesting as some of the others in
the context of domain names. This is true because the strength of the mark
is a factor that should be no different in the domain name context than in
any other. The strength of the plaintiffs mark should be the same no
matter in what manner the alleged infringement takes place. What is
interesting about this factor, however, is the way in which some courts
have, as explained below, apparently adapted their analysis of it, despite
the foregoing assertion that a new context should not change the court's
thinking.
A mark's strength is its "tendency to identify the goods sold under the
mark as emanating from a particular, although possibly anonymous,
source."4' The stronger the mark, the more protection it receives under a
likelihood of confusion analysis.4 ' Strong or famous marks are at the
38. See. e.g., TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar Communications, Inc., 244 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2001);
Interstellar Starship Servs., Ltd. v. Epix, Inc., 184 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1999); Data Concepts, Inc.
v. Digital Consulting, Inc., 150 F.3d 620 (6th Cir. 1998); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc.,
223 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 2000).

39. The Seventh Circuit has put such policy grounds this way: "to protect registered marks
from interference by state legislation, prevent unfair competition, and protect against fraud 'by the
use of reproductions, copies, counterfeits, or colorable imitations of registered marks .. .- Eli
Lilly v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d at 461 (2000) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2001)).
40. Paddington Corp. v. Attiki Importers & Distribs., Inc., 996 F.2d 577, 585, 27 U.S.P.Q.
1194 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting McGregor-Doniger, Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1131, 202
U.S.P.Q. 81 (2d Cir. 1979)).

41. See Nike, Inc. v. "Just Did It"Enters., 6 F.3d 1225, 1228 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1385, 1389 (7th
Cir. 1993) (citing SquirtCo v. Seven Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086, 1091 (8th Cir. 1980) ("A strong and
distinctive trademark is entitled to greater protection than a weak or commonplace one.").
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"summit of strength" 42 and deserve the strongest protection. Some
commentators have noted ajudicial willingness to find marks more famous
in the domain name context than otherwise plausible.43 Because federal
dilution claims, notwithstanding the ACPA,44 require a showing of
famousness, there were several pre-ACPA cases that dealt with the issue
of a mark's famousness. Scholars have questioned the finding of marks
like LA OPINION, 4 INTERMATIC, 46 and TELETECH 47 to be famous
when such status has traditionally been reserved for marks like
POLAROID and TIFFANY. 48 To at least some, it is clear that the law here
is being stretched to favor the trademark holder.49
As previously mentioned, this factor of the Sleekcraft analysis is at
least ostensibly neutral with respect to the new context of domain names
and other Internet naming schemes. Thus, it is sufficient to move on while
noting the bias of some courts in domain name cases toward trademark
holders.
2. Proximity of the Goods
Proximity of the goods is obviously an odd fit in the context of domain
name cases. The worry here is that "for related goods, the danger presented
is that the public will mistakenly assume there is an association between
the producers of the related goods, though no such association exists."5
But it is common that defendants in domain name cases do not offer any
product for sale at all. Moreover, for those domain name owners who do
run web sites utilizing their domain name as a Uniform Resource Locator
or address, the service offered under the domain name frequently has no
relationship at all to the plaintiff's product or services. In Sporty's Farm
v. Sportman's Market,5 a case originally brought under the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act but ultimately resolved under the ACPA, the
domain name owner sold Christmas trees via its website while the

42. RICHARD L. KIRKPATRICK, LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION IN TRADEMARK LAW § 3.2, at 3-4
(Sept. 1996).
43. See, e.g., Lisa Carroll, A Better Way to Skin the Cat: Resolving Domain Name Disputes
Using State Unfair CompetitionLaw, 18 No. 2 INTELL. PROP. L. NEWSL. 1, at 3 (2000).
44. Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501 (2000).
45. See Lozano Enters. v. La Opinion Publ'g Co., 44 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1764, 1768-69 (C.D. Cal.
1997).
46.
47.
1997).
48.
Issues in
49.
50.
51.

See Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1239 (N.D. I11.1996).
See Teletech Customer Care Mgmt. v. Teletech Co., 977 F. Supp. 1407, 1412 (C.D. Cal.
See generally Martin B. Schwimmer, Domain Names and Everything Else: Trademark
Cyberspace, 569 PLI/P at 381 (1999).
Id.
Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 350.
202 F.3d 489 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 2719 (2000).
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challenging trademark owner sold primarily aviation related products and
some "tools and home accessories" through its catalog. 2 In Avery
Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton,53 the defendant domain name owner was in
the business of selling email addresses utilizing the domain names at issue
while the plaintiff trademark owner was the maker of adhesive labels and
other office supplies. In both Sporty's and Avery the defendant prevailed
as to any confusion claimed by plaintiff. Accordingly, in cases where the
products or services of plaintiff and defendant are similar or identical,
confusion has been found. 4
In proceeding then, we should be wary of instances where goods and
services of defendants and plaintiffs are not similar. In such cases, this
factor of confusion should favor domain name holders. Where such a
result is not reached, it is crucial to look for reasons as to why an
alternative decision occurred. This analysis will be particularly relevant in
the later portions of this Article dealing with UDRP resolutions and initial
interest confusion.
3. Similarity of the Marks
The degree to which marks are similar is critical to the likelihood of
confusion analysis because the more difficult it is to tell two marks apart,
the greater the likelihood of consumer confusion. Yet, holding similarity
of marks constant, there is a great deal of variance between confusion that
may occur in one case or context as compared to a different case or
context. As Professor McCarthy put it,
The degree of similarity of the marks needed to prove likely
confusion will vary with the difference in the goods and services of
the parties. Where the goods and services are directly competitive,
the degree of similarity required to prove a likelihood of confusion
is less than in the case of dissimilar products."
With this in mind, and in light of the foregoing section concerning
proximity of goods, it should be noted at the outset that where products or
services of the defendant and plaintiff are entirely dissimilar, a close
similarity of marks is substantially less incriminating than if the marks
were used on products similar or competitive in nature.
52. Id. at 493.
53. 189 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 1999).
54. See SNA, Inc. v. Array, 51 F. Supp. 2d 542, 545 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (finding plaintiff
manufactured and sold product under SEAWIND mark while defendant registered seawind.net and
used it to offer services related to assembly of SEAWIND product).
55. 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETmON § 23:20.1, at 23-61
(4th ed. 2000).
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Of course, where marks are extremely similar or exactly the same,
there are many more questions to be answered and a much more subtle
process of analysis to be performed. As such, there are relevant technical
characteristics of domain names and other Internet naming schemes that
quickly become important under this factor of confusion. For instance,
domain names may only contain certain characters, excluded from which
is the apostrophe. Moreover, domain names cannot incorporate spaces that
separate words from each other in trademarked phrases or multiple word
names. With only these two limitations considered, one might already be
confused as to what the web address of a company named "Bob's
Flowers" might be for example. Why such a lack of clarity matters is
related to the theory behind an accusation of consumer confusion in the
context of domain names. In the case of an alleged "cybersquatter," the
complaining trademark owner must subscribe to one of two theories as to
why the defendant's ownership of the domain name will result in
confusion of consumers. The first theory is that some consumers will
attempt to guess the plaintiff's web address by typing in a URL of the form
www.companyname.com. The second theory is that the defendant's
domain name may confuse those consumers who see it as part of a search
engine result or as a listing on some similar site. 6 Both of these theories
seem to misunderstand the nature of the World Wide Web and the DNS
upon which it and the rest of the Internet rely for domain name operability.
The first theory discussed above is problematic for a number of
reasons; some are relevant to the present similarity of marks discussion
and some will become more apparent in later sections of this Article."
Returning to Bob's Flowers as an example, it is unclear whether a
consumer attempting to reach the website of such a business would guess
a URL ofbobsflowers.com, bobs-flowers.com, bobs flowers.com, or some
other variant thereof. The existence of this uncertainty makes certain
things true. First, consumers will face an intrinsic amount of uncertainty
if they do indeed guess at the URL of company names and, as such, will
likely have low expectations about the effectiveness of their domain name
guessing practices. If a consumer knows that his guesses at company

56. For example, a web index such as Yahoo!, available at http://www.yahoo.com (last
visited Dec. 19, 2001). This theory has been advanced by plaintiffs in several domain name cases.
See Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1058 (9th Cir.
1999).
In the Internet context, in particular, entering a web site takes little effort usually one click from a linked site or a search engine's list; thus, Web surfers are
more likely to be confused as to the ownership of a web site than traditional
patrons of a brick-and-mortar store would be of a store's ownership.
57. See infra §§ Ill(B), IIl(C).
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URLs have been unsuccessful in the past, it seems a significant stretch to
call him confused when he guesses incorrectly and ends up at the wrong
site - most, if not all, people must understand that this is a significant
possibility. A highly relevant question for courts and litigants is to what
extent consumers who do guess company URLs do have these sorts of
lowered expectations, and accordingly, the inability to be legally confused.
The second theory is also problematic and seems to misunderstand
basic underpinnings of the way search engines and the Internet work.
Ostensibly, trademark owners believe consumers will be confused when
they employ a search engine to find web sites and one or more or the
resulting hits has a URL comprised of a domain name similar or identical
to plaintiff's trademark. The above consideration regarding uncertainty for
those who have had experience guessing company URLs will still apply
here, but what about those consumers who do not guess domain names and
may still be confused? As above, courts should consider the experience of
such users coming to any conclusions about confusion. If consumers have
experienced failure in finding information or products using search
engines, they will be unlikely to expect perfection in the future. In fact,
web searchers seem to be frustrated in general with the failure of search
engines." But perhaps there is a small subset of users who have perfect
records of searching for company web sites using search engines. Surely,
there will be confusion when they come upon the web site of a crafty
domain name holder who has taken the mark of another entity for his
URL. This possibility seems unlikely, and even if such cases do exist, the
question is whether confusion is likely, not possible.
The characteristics of domain names and search engines discussed
above are merely a few which are relevant to the determination of the
likelihood of confusion of similar marks. There are many more that will
not be discussed in detail here. For example, how should courts react to the
fact that domain names may be registered by anyone? If everyone in the
Internet-consuming public knew this, it seems logical that they would be
more skeptical whenever they guessed a company's URL, used a search
engine, or otherwise traveled through the Internet. So why haven't any
courts considered this question? Moreover, what other technical or policy
limitations of the DNS and the World Wide Web might be missing from
court and dispute resolution panel decisions?
In summary, there are a multitude of technical and behavioral factors
that could potentially affect the likelihood that consumers will be
confused. Where domain names and marks are particularly similar, these
58. See Ben Charny, The World Wide $#@%@Sing Web!, ZDNETNEWS 5 (Dec. 23,2000),
available at http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/news/0,4586,2667216,00.html (citing survey
showing 86% of Internet users expressing that a more efficient way to search the web should be in
place).
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factors are even more important. The brief examination of a few such
factors tends to show that the presumption of no likelihood of confusion
is very reasonable. Thus, as an initial matter, it seems that the burden of
dissipating the import of such a presumption into the greater likelihood of
confusion analysis should be on the trademark owner.
4. Evidence of Actual Confusion
Perhaps the most intriguing factor in the likelihood of confusion
analysis is evidence of actual confusion. Many a trademark student has
read about the odd machinations of litigants and courts trying to assess
actual confusion of consumers in the marketplace. Trademark owners
typically offer evidence of actual confusion in one of two forms. The first
is specific instances of confusion - for example, misdirected email or
other correspondence, or a customer willing to testify that she was actually
confused. The second type of evidence consists of survey results and
accompanying expert testimony. In such surveys, litigants "create an
experimental environment from which we can get useful data from which
to make informed inferences about the likelihood that actual confusion will
take place."59
Not surprisingly, use of actual confusion as evidence of a likelihood
that confusion has been rare in Internet name cases. For domain names that
have not yet been utilized for any Internet service, there can be little or no
exposure to the consuming public that could lead to confusion. For many
other domain names and Internet names the defendant's use of the name
has been minimal enough so that a lack of actual evidence of confusion is
not particularly probative in favoring his or her use of the mark. In total,
there has been minimal use of actual confusion evidence in Internet name
litigation thus far.
Yet there is a powerful observation to be made regarding actual
confusion in the marketplace of Internet consumers. Unlike the real world,
the Internet is confined by many technical constraints. Professor Lawrence
Lessig has been a leading exponent of what has been obvious to those
building the architecture of the Internet since its beginning - that the
underlying code and nature of the Internet set a baseline that the legal
system must both appreciate and respect in its operation.' There are many
examples within the context of Internet name law that highlight Lessig's

59. 4 J. MCCARTHY, MCCARTHYON TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 32:184 (4th

ed. 2000).
60. See generally LAWRENCELESSIG, CODEANDOTHERLAWSOFCYBERSPACE (Basic Books
2000); Lawrence Lessig, The Laws of Cyberspace (Mar. 1998) (essay presented at Taiwain Net '98
Conference, Taipei, unpublished manuscript, available at http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/lessig/
content/works/lawscyberspace.pdf.
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point and it is not clear that courts and others are in a position to decide
whether Internet name law issues have grasped these examples.
As alluded to earlier, there are many technical characteristics of the
DNS and the World Wide Web that work to shape the way trademarks are
used and perceived. Importantly, these are characteristics that do not have
readily apparent analogs in the real world. As such, these characteristics
uniquely inform the analysis of consumer confusion in the context of
Internet names. Moreover, these technical characteristics have nontechnical implications that are perhaps even more important to the analysis
of consumer confusion. Following are several examples of systemic
characteristics, both technical and non-technical, which are germane to the
concept of confusion among Internet users.
The DNS allows only one instance of any given domain name. This
simple fact means that, unlike real world trademark use, only one person
or entity can use a given mark as a domain name. Whereas in the real
world, several users of the exact same mark may exist in harmony
provided there is sufficient product or geographic dissimilarity, only one
user may own the domain name consisting of that mark. Consequently,
there are many instances where marks having numerous potential
legitimate and illegitimate potential owners are inherently likely to lead
some Internet users to the wrong website. The importance of this quality
of theDNS is that, insofar as consumers recognize this fact, it is unlikely
they will expect whatever is behind a given domain name to be exactly
what they had hoped for. In most if not all cases, it seems logical that
consumers guessing at the URLs of people or organizations they wish to
reach will withhold judgment about the correctness of their guess. The
same, it seems likely, would be the case for those clicking on domain
names from some linking site.
People control the functionality of the search engine. Thus, these
massive stores of information respond to user requests for information
based not on some static, predictable algorithm, but on the determinations
of their owners. The point of this observation is not to suggest that search
engine operators have some secret agenda in the control of what their
search engines return to users. Indeed, the goal of most search engines is
to give users what they want - timely, relevant responses to their queries.
Instead this property of search engines means that they are naturally
dynamic and unpredictable creatures whose performance and results
change not only by virtue of the constantly churning mass of Internet
content, but also due to the desires of their owners. One obvious example
of this phenomenon is the adoption of paid entries by search engine
operators. The result of this adoption is that the highest bidder gets to
appear at the top of a list of search results for a particular word or phrase.
Likewise, the second highest bidder appears second on the list, and so on.
It is one thing for a search engine to operate in this manner from its
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beginning; 61 it is quite another for a search engine to adopt such a practice
in midstream.62 Because search engine results are so clearly the product of
several factors - actual relevance of content, quickness in entry of the
engine, and now the amount paid to the engine - it becomes more
difficult to say that consumers have any, not to mention a reasonable,
reliance in the quality of search engines to deliver them to the owner of the
trademark they happen to be searching for.
As before, the question is whether there is truly any consumer
confusion going on here. There is generally, and Internet names are no
exception, an inability of trademark owners to present evidence of actual
confusion of Internet consumers. But where there are properties of the
technical underpinnings of the Internet - the DNS, the World Wide Web,
search engines - most of which point to the systemic unlikelihood of
consumer confusion, we ought to pay heed.
5. Marketing Channels Used
This factor has been perhaps the most often contested in domain name
litigation. On the purpose of this factor, Professor McCarthy states,
Obviously, if the goods of one party are sold to one class of buyers
in a different marketing context than the goods of another seller, the
likelihood that a single group of buyers will be confused by similar
trademarks is less than if both parties sold their goods through the
same channel of distribution.63
The question for the Internet name context is whether the Internet at large
is a single "marketing channel" for purposes of a likelihood of confusion
analysis. Clearly, if it is, then this factor works drastically against domain
name holders fending off trademark owners, since all such domain name
owners would prima facie be operating within the same channel as any
potential trademark holder also using the Internet.
While traditional trademark analysis of channels of trade has been quite
narrow, 64 early cases dealing with the factor in the domain name context

61. GoTo is such a search engine, available at http://www.goto.com.
62. See generally Danny Sullivan, Yahoo Gets Paid Listings, 5 (Feb. 2, 2001), available
at http://www.searchenginewatch.com/sereport/01/02-yahoo.html (noting, "with the new Yahoo
program, Excite remains the only major service not to have [paid placement listings].").
63. 4 J. THOMAs MCCARTHY, McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §
24.51 (4th ed. 2000).
64. See Martin B. Schwimmer, Domain Names and Everything Else: Trademark Issues in
Cyberspace, 569 PLI/P at 381, 405 (July 1999) (stating that for products sold in grocery markets,
the "channel" has been construed to be as small as the respective aisle a product exists in within

the grocery store).
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seem to go the opposite way. The Court in InterstellarStarship Services,
Ltd. v. Epix, Inc.65 dealt with this factor of confusion by simply noting that
both litigants "market themselves through the Internet." Likewise, the
court in Data Concepts, Inc. v. Digital Consulting" affirmed the trial
court's finding that the parties' mutual use of the Internet "enhances the
likelihood of confusion for customers using the Internet to access either
company. 67
Some commentators have been quick to attack these rulings, 68 and
rightly so. First and foremost, the Internet is a communications medium.
Intrinsically, it is no more tied to any particular form or type of
advertisement or commercial activity than is the spectrum of
electromagnetic waves through which radio, television, telephone,
satellite, and dozens of other signals are transmitted. Of course, in virtually
all Internet name cases, the World Wide Web, which represents only one
function of the Internet, might at least be construed more fairly to
constitute a marketing channel than the Internet at large. But it would seem
patently unfair to stop there in defining what are and are not the same
marketing channels. Even on the Web, there are many quite distinct modes
of advertising which could very well be entirely separate with respect to
the groups of consumers who access them. For instance, banner ads are
quite commonly specific to a particular site or group of sites. Advertisers
targeting consumers of aerospace materials will likely focus their
advertising dollar on banner ads that will reach those consumers and not
the general public. The sophistication of online advertising makes these
results eminently possible. For a court to find that a domain name owner's
own web site's existence on the Web puts its marketing in the same
channel as a competing domain name owner, some suspect assumptions
must be made. It does not seem justifiable to apply a different standard for
segmenting markets into channels to the Internet than to any more
traditional marketplace.

65. 983 F. Supp. 1331 (D.C. Or. 1997).
66. 150 F.3d 620 (6th Cir. 1998).
67. Id. at 627.
68. See Danielle Weinberg Swartz, Note, The Limitations ofTrademark Law in Addressing
Domain Name Disputes,45 UCLA L. REv. 1487, 1503 (June 1998) ("In the context of the Internet,
the marketing channel factor is problematic because, like the proximity factor, it sometimes favors
infringement even when such a finding is not desirable or appropriate.").
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6. Type of Goods and the Degree of Care Likely
to Be Exercised by the Purchaser
Trademark law only seeks to protect the reasonably prudent buyer of
goods and services from confusion.69 Of course, what is reasonable to
expect from a buyer will depend on the nature of the goods or services
purchased as well as the market for those goods or services. The Court is
to consider the "general impression of the ordinary purchaser, buying
under the normally prevalent conditions of the market and giving the
attention such purchasers usually give in buying that class of goods." 70
Under this factor of confusion, marks for goods and services with
markets populated by sophisticated buyers will be less susceptible to
infringement by similar marks. Without delving into complex factual
possibilities, it seems fair to say that things like professional services and
high technology goods will have potential buyers who are more able to
discern between products or services encountered on the Internet. Thus,
where domain name cases deal with marks for such products and services,
courts should consider this factor.
Moreover, courts should consider the rapidly evolving nature of the
Internet when thinking about this factor. As previously mentioned, there
are certain characteristics of the Internet and the World Wide Web that, if
known to the consumer, would likely reduce the possibility of their
confusion. As the Internet becomes more and more pervasive as an
institution within society, knowledge of its underlying architecture will
likely increase. Even as few as five years ago, in 1996, the public's
awareness of the way in which the Internet operates was drastically
different than it is today. Thus, courts must heavily scrutinize domain
name cases from several years ago for applicability in a present world that
is markedly different in extremely relevant ways.
. 7. Defendant's Intent in Selecting the Mark
Intent to confuse a trademark owner's potential consumers would
undoubtedly be probative of a domain name user's likelihood of confusing
those consumers. Therefore, analysis of this factor should be little changed
when applied to the newer context of Internet names.

69. See generally3 J. MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 23:94 (4th ed. 2000).
70. W.W.W. Pharm. Co. v. Gillette Co., 984 F.2d 567, 575,25 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1593, 1599 (2d
Cir. 1993) (quoting 3 R. CALLMAN, THE COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS, AND MONOPOLIES § 81.2
(3d ed. 1969)).
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But often in domain name disputes the defendant's intent becomes so
important as to be dispositive. 7' As this phenomenon has been most readily
apparent in the context of "initial interest" confusion cases and UDRP
decisions, both of which are discussed in subsequent sections of this
Article, a fuller discussion later is appropriate. In the present context of
traditional likelihood of confusion under the Lanham Act, however, intent
has recently become especially important through the enactment of the
ACPA.
The ACPA provides for a cause of action against anyone who registers
a domain and meets all of several requirements, one of which is a "bad
faith intent to profit from that mark., 72 The ACPA also requires that the
domain name in question be "identical or confusingly similar. 73 Though
persons registering domains identical to someone else's trademark will
clearly meet this qualification, those with domains consisting of anything
other than an exact trademark would force potential plaintiffs to meet an
additional burden. Since "the phrase 'confusingly similar' is shorthand for
saying that concurrent use of conflicting marks will create a likelihood of
confusion, and hence infringement, 74 the foregoing confusion analysis is
relevant to cases brought under the ACPA. Nearly all ACPA cases brought
thus far either deal with domain names identical to the trademark holder's75
mark or are dismissed or settled before resolution on the merits.
Therefore, this issue has not been clearly dealt with by federal courts. It
should be remembered, however, since many of the trademark owners in
UDRP cases, notwithstanding their success within UDRP procedures,
would have resort only to the ACPA or the infringement clause of the
Lanham Act.

71. See generally Linda A. Heban, "There is Nothing Either Good or Bad, But Thinking
Makes ItSo ": the Relevance oflntent to InitialInterestConfusion, 5 NO. 8 CYBERSPACE L. 6 (Nov.
2000).
72. See ACPA of 1999, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i) (2001).
73. Id. § i125(d)(1)(A)(ii).
74. 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §

23:4 (4th ed. 2000) (citing opinion of Judge Rich in Motorola, Inc. v. Griffiths Elecs., Inc., 317
F.2d 397, 400, 137 U.S.P.Q. 551, 554 (C.C.P.A. 1963)).
75. See, e.g, Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Lucentsucks.Com, 95 F. Supp. 2d 528, 536 (granting
defendant's motion to dismiss on jurisdiction grounds), United Greeks, Inc. v. Klein, 2000 WL
554196, at * I (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (defaulting defendant who owned some domains that were identical
to plaintiff and some that were not); butsee Elecs. Boutique Holding Corp. v. Zuccarini, 2000 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 15719 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (holding that domains consisting of misspelled versions of
plaintiff's trademarks were confusingly similar and noting that defendant's enterprise's profitability
was "completely dependent on his ability to create and register domain names that are confusingly
similar to famous names," and citing evidence of actual confusion).
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8. Likelihood of Expansion of the Product Lines
If there is one factor in the Sleekcraft test that is the worst fit to the
domain name context, it is the likelihood of expansion of the product lines.
Of course, this assumes that, like in many domain name disputes, the
domain name registrant offers no product or service in competition with
trademark owner. Thus, the reason for this factor's inapplicability is
because it is only relevant where there is actually competition between the
parties. As infrequently as this occurs in domain name disputes, this factor
is typically not worthy of discussion.
B. UDRP
The Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy, briefly mentioned above, is
the increasingly utilized set of rules that all domain name registrants of
.com, .net, and .org domains agree to when they register their names. The
UDRP is promulgated by ICANN, which has legal control over the root
Domain Name System server that is the authoritative directory of .COM,
.NET, and .ORG domain names on the Internet.
The UDRP provides trademark owners with the power to dispute the
registration of domain names that allegedly infringe upon their
trademark.76 The challenging party reserves the right to select one of
several dispute resolution services to adjudicate their claim." In almost
every case, the selected dispute resolution service is either the National
Arbitration Forum (NAF) or the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO). Not surprisingly, these two services find in favor of the
complaining party some eighty percent of the time, as compared with sixty
percent for the more rarely selected services, the CPR institute and eRes.78
The bulk of all arbitration, nearly sixty-one percent of disputes, are
decided by a WIPO panel.79 It is difficult to understate the inherent conflict
of interest in resolution proceedings initiated by a trademark owner being
decided by members of a group that "is responsible for the promotion of
the protection of intellectual property throughout the world."8 ° The
problem with WIPO decisions that make up a majority of all UDRP
decisions is readily apparent from the decisions themselves. Some of the
WIPO panel decisions handed down since the UDRP was established have

76. See ICANN, Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 1 (Oct. 24, 1999),
available at http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-policy-24oct99.htm (last updated June 4, 2000).

77. Id. at 4(d).
78. See Milton Meuller, RoughJustice:An Analysis ofICANN's Uniform DisputeResolution
Policy 3.4, available at http://dcc.syr.edu/roughjustice.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2000).
79. Id.
80. World Intellectual Property Organization: An Organization for the Future, available at
http://www.wipo.org/eng/newindex/about.htm (last visited Dec. 10, 1999).
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been without support from the plain language of the UDRP or the relevant
portions of U.S. trademark referenced by UDRP panelists.
Paragraph 4(a) of the UDRP requires a complainant to show three
things in order to succeed in having a domain name transferred to it:
(i) [the domain name registered by the respondent] is identical or
confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the
complainant has rights; (ii) [the respondent has] no rights or
legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and (iii) [the]
domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith."'
Considering that some of the crucial language in the UDRP is identical to
that found in the Lanham Act and its subsequent common law
interpretation, and that the purpose of the UDRP is to provide a means for
trademark protection, it seems quite reasonable that dispute resolution
panelists would draw from existing U.S. trademark law in giving meaning
to UDRP rules. And yet, many UDRP decisions, particularly those from
WIPO and NAF panels, seem to ignore the existence both of the explicit
terms of the UDRP and any semblance of U.S. trademark law. Several
examples follow.
1. StandardCharteredPLC v. PurgeL T.
Perhaps the most notable examples of UDRP, and specifically WIPO,
dispute resolution oddity are the "sucks" cases. In these cases, the
complainant seeks the transfer of a domain name having the form of
trademarksucks.com. In one such dispute, involving the domain name
standardcharteredsucks.com,1 2 a WIPO panel held for the complainant.
Their explanation for finding that the domain was "confusingly similar"
to the complainant's trademark was that:
Given the apparent mushrooming of complaints sites identified
by reference to the target's name, can it be said that the registration
would be recognized as an address plainly dissociated from the
Complainant? In the Panel's opinion, this is by no means
necessarily so. The first and immediately striking element in the
Domain Name is the Complainant's name and adoption of it in the
Domain Name is inherently likely to lead some people to believe
that the Complainant is connected with it. Some will treat the
additional "sucks" as a pejorative exclamation and therefore

81. ICANN, supra note 76, at 4(a).
82. Standard Chartered PLC v. Purge I.T., WIPO Case No. D2000-0681, 5 (June 26,2000),
available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/htmi/2000/d2000-068 l.html.
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dissociate it after all from the Complainant; but equally others may
be unable to give it any very definite meaning and will be confused
about the potential association with the Complainant.
The dubious assertion that significant numbers of relevant viewers of
standardcharteredsucks.com will believe that the site is associated with
Standard Chartered not only seems to defy common sense, but also is at
odds with the U.S. trademark law. Whether the use of a trademark is likely
to cause confusion is not a determination made by the haphazard guess of
a few individuals, devoid of any documented proof of deliberation or
recognition of the facts at hand. Rather, confusion is determined by the
sort of test exemplified by the Sleekcraft factors. The panel in Standard
Chartered evinced not even the slightest attempt to apply such factors, and
thus, is wholly separated from any judicially determined confusion as
required by U.S. trademark law.
2. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Walsucks and Walmarket Puerto Rico 3
In another "sucks" dispute, this time involving the domain
walmartcanadasucks.com, the WIPO panel explicitly referenced the
Sleekcraft factors in their analysis of whether the domain name in question
was confusingly similar to the complainant's mark, "Wal-Mart." While
ignoring all factors of the test except those it subsequently found to favor
the complainant, the panel seemed to make the same argument for
confusion found in the standardchartered.com case - that consumers
would somehow come upon the domain name and click it, thinking it was
in some way affiliated with Wal-Mart. Wal-Mart argued that "consumers
are likely to believe that any domain name incorporating the Wal-Mart
name (or WalMart) is associated with Complainant."'" Yet this argument
does not seem to comport with the way relevant technology works. The
panel cited the example of a domain showing up in a search engine and
thereby confusing consumers as to affiliation because of its "similarity" to
Wal-Mart's mark. However, every major search engine"' returns not only
a domain name or URL with search results, but also a title of the linked
page and a short description when available. If this were not enough to
distinguish the stray Wal-Mart searcher from heading to the respondent's
domain name, then the fact that search results at every major search engine

83. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Walsucks & Walmarket Puerto Rico, WIPO Case No.
D2000-0477 (July 20, 2000), available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisionshtmi/2000/
d2000-0477.htrnl.

84. Id. 5(0).
85. See, e.g, http://www.altavista.com; http://www.northemlight.com; http://www.excite.
corn; http://www.google.com.
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are organized by relevancy 6 should be the final clue. The panel cited no
evidence whatsoever that either the respondent's domain name would be
indexed by a search engine or was submitted to a search engine. Again,
confusion must be likely rather than merely possible.
The panel was also careful to distinguish the holding of the trademark
case Bally TotalFitnessHoldingCorp. v. Faber,7 which denied plaintiff s
request for dismissal where defendant's "Bally's Sucks" web site
incorporated a Bally logo, numerous uses of the phrase "Bally's Sucks"
and a URL, but not a domain, that incorporated the term "ballysucks." The
panel in Wal-Mart distinguished its case from Bally on the grounds that
Bally did not involve a domain name. This is obviously a distinction
without a difference because, for purposes of search engines, a domain
name and a URL incorporating some term are functionally the same. In
fact, the issue in Bally was precisely the same as that in Wal-Mart whether the use of "sucks" after a trademark, either in the title of a web
site or the domain name of its URL - would confuse those who saw it
subsequently, either in a search engine or elsewhere.
Indeed, it is mysterious how the panel in Wal-Mart suspected that the
respondent's name would show up at all in a search engine, nevertheless
appear so prominently and confusingly as to lead a considerable number
of people to the respondent's site. This finding is especially confounding
in light of the fact that the panel ignored all five factors of the Sleekcraft
test ostensibly favoring the respondent. The record of the case is void of
any reference to the respondent having a similar product or service as WalMart, any advertising in similar channels or advertising at all, or any actual
confusion of any kind.
What is particularly worrisome about the Wal-Mart panel decision is
that it has served as precedent for so many other UDRP decisions.
Moreover, the Wal-Mart decision was decided by a single panelist and in
a system with no internal appeals process. The effect of these systemic
limitations of the UDRP process will be discussed later in part III.
3. The Guinness Case
Particularly troubling in the "sucks" line of UDRP decisions is the
8 In that dispute, several domains
decision in Diageoplcv. John Zuccarini."
incorporating the complainant's "Guinness" trademark were found to be

86. Those that provide paid-for listings put the highest bidder at the top, followed by the most
relevant results thereafter in descending order.
87. 29 F. Supp. 2d 1161 (C.D. Cal. 1998)
88. WIPO Case No. D2000-0996 (2000) UDRP LEXIS 752 (Oct. 22, 2000), available at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0996.html.
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confusingly similar to it. The domains included guinness-beer-reallyreally-sucks.com, guinnessbeerreallysucks.com, and guinness-beer-sucks.
com.
The Wal-Mart decision was cited as precedent. Additionally, the Court
went through the Sleekcraft factors itself, noting the "difficulty of
slavishly applying a test developed in the context of trademark law to these
disputes." As one might suspect, many of the highly questionable
conclusions made by federal courts in early domain name cases were
repeated in the panel's analysis. The challenges to these conclusions, made
earlier in this Article, are just as relevant here, where the Sleekcraft test is
explicitly adopted.
4. Other "Sucks.com" and Similar Cases
There are several other UDRP decisions involving domain names
consisting of a trademark with the word "sucks" concatenated to the end.
The complainant wins the vast majority of these cases and more or less
follow the reasoning of the Wal-Mart panel.89 Yet there are a few notable
exceptions.
Closely related to the "sucks.com" line of cases is the matter of
90 At issue
Compusa Management Co. v. Customized Computer Training.
in the case were respondent's domains bancompusa.com and
stopcompusa.com. The panelist there found that "No one could confuse"'"
the challenged domains and the complainant's trademark, "COMPUSA."
It is difficult if not impossible to reconcile the outcome of this case with
the aforementioned "sucks.com" decisions favoring complainants on the
issue of confusion. The pejorative word added to the domain name in the
CompUSA case comes before the trademark, whereas it comes after the
word in the "sucks.com" cases. But this is a distinction without a
difference, since panelists in the "sucks.com" cases argue that it is in the
context of a search engine, where Internet users will be able to view the
entire domain name themselves, that consumers will be confused.
Instead, it is reasonable to posit that the CompUSA and the other
"sucks.com" cases evince a significant difference of opinion among their

89. See, e.g., Nat'l Westminster Bank PLC v. Purge I.T. & Purge I.T., Ltd., WIPO Case No.
D2000-0636 (2000), available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domainsldecisions/html/2000/d2000-0636.
html (analyzing natwestsucks.com); Cabela's, Inc. v. Cupcake Patrol, NAF Case No.
FA0006000095080 (2000), available athttp://www.arbforum.com/domains/decisions/95080.htm
(analyzing cabelasucks.com).
90. NAF Case No. FA0006000095082 (2000), available at http://www.arbforum.com/
domains/decisions/95082.htm.
91. Id.at Findings I.
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respective panelists. It has been argued here that common sense, the law,
and anyone with a good understanding of the technology at issue, must
clearly take the position of the NAF panelist in CompUSA.
C. Illusion: InitialInterest Confusion
Returning once again to the Lanham Act, this last section will deal with
a fairly new concept within trademark infringement law, that of initial
interest confusion. The doctrine of initial interest confusion recognizes that
"infringement can be based upon confusion that creates initial customer
interest, even though no actual sale is finally completed as a result of the
confusion."92 The hope for many trademark owners wishing to prevent use
of their mark on the Internet has been that initial interest confusion would
provide a cause of action against owners of domain names incorporating
their mark. The theory behind such a cause of action is that consumers
looking for a trademark owner's site on the Internet would, because of an
infringing domain name, be lured away from the trademark owner's web
site. Once there, the argument goes, it does not matter that the customer
realizes they are not at the trademark owner's web site, since the attraction
of the consumers was essentially free riding on the good will of the
trademark owner's mark.
Widely hailed as supporting this general theory is the case of
Brookfield Communications,Inc. v. West Coast EntertainmentCorp.93 In
Brookfield, plaintiff Brookfield Communications was the owner of the
trademark MOVIEBUFF, which it used to identify a computer software
program cataloging various information on movies and the movie industry.
Brookfield had also begun to offer its movie database to consumers of the
Internet. The defendant, West Coast, operated a chain of video stores.
West Coast had been preparing a web site for its business that would
provide, among other things, a searchable database of movie information
for visitors to its website. The dispute arose because West Coast registered
and planned to use the domain name moviebuff.com to host its web site.
The Brookfield court determined that use of MOVIEBUFF by West Coast
was not permissible "tacking" on to its mark, "THE MOVIE BUFF'S
MOVIE STORE."
The Brookfield court found that "web surfers looking for Brookfield's
'MovieBuff' products who are taken by a search engine to
"westcoastvideo.com" will find a database similar enough to 'MovieBuff
such that a sizeable number of consumers who were originally looking for

92. 3 J. MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23:6 (4th
ed. 2000) (citing Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 2 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1677
(2d Cir. 1987)).
93. 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999).
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Brookfield's product will simply decide to utilize West Coast's offering
instead."" Thus, while any true confusion of the Internet user as to where
his click will take him exists only instantaneously, this initial interest
confusion was found sufficient to constitute trademark infringement by
West Coast.
Despite the acclaimed value of Brookfield as precedent for trademark
owners, there are several significant limitations on the holding in the case.
These limitations make the holding inapplicable to a substantial majority
of domain name disputes while making Brookfield itself considerably
more reasonable than the dangerous trademark owner's tool some have
purported it to be.
First, for most domain names that are newly registered or unused, there
are very good technical reasons why such a domain name would not be
viewed by any more than a handful of users, not to mention the "sizeable"
number of consumers posited in Brookfleld. There are several factors that
contribute to whether the contents of a web server identified by a domain
name will ever be indexed by a search engine, or more to the point, given
sufficient weight in that index so as to be exposed to any more than an
insignificant number of consumers. Because search engine technology is
largely proprietary, the specifics of search engine machinations are
difficult to assess. However, it should be powerful evidence that the goal
of all search engines is relevancy to the user's desired search terms - to
weed out those web sites with little or no useful information. Moreover,
the computer programs called "spiders" that "crawl" the web for
information eventually indexed by search engines are unlikely to come
upon web sites for which the user has just registered a domain name. This
is true because in order to be included in a search engine, either a spider's
operator must enter the URL of the site in question or the spider must be
led to that URL, traveling through some degree of separation by following
all links in between. If a domain name owner has never used his domain
name, or for all intents and purposes, nobody knows about it, the odds of
it being indexed in a search engine are extremely low. This is particularly
so given the fact that Google, the largest search engine, contains under
twenty percent of the web pages on the Internet.95 This, of course, is to say
nothing of the fact that URLs with little or no information concerning the
trademark holder will be given very low relevancy ratings," and thus will
appear at the bottom of a list of hundreds or thousands of search results,

94. Id. at 1062.
95. See Charny, supra note 58 ("At last count, search engine Google was perusing 1.3 billion
Web pages, which isn't even 20% of the capacity under the '.com' top level domain.").
96. See Sergey Brin & Lawrence Page, The Anatomy of a Large-Scale Hypertextual Web
Search Engine,availableat http://www.scu.edu.au/programme/fulipapers/1921/coml92l.htm (last
visited Nov. 11, 2001).
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if at all. In Brookfield, the defendant had both begun full operation of its
web site97 as well as initiated a widespread publicity campaign" for it by
the time the Brookfieldcourt had granted a temporary restraining order for
the plaintiff.
Secondly, the analogy used in Brookfield, on which the Brookfield
court grounded its policy rationale, is a significant stretch for even the
most vehement trademark supporter. The analogy used by the Brookfield
court was intended to explain the Brookfield court's holding against West
Coast's use of"meta tags," unseen parts of the underlying code of a web
page that give search engines information about that page's date, content,
author, and other relevant topics. However, the analogy presumably
supports the domain name portion of the Brookfield court's ruling, since
it is in the same search engine context that both meta tag use and domain
name use of an infringing mark allegedly cause confusion. In any event,
the analogy is as follows:
Suppose West Coast's competitor (let's call it "Blockbuster") puts
up a billboard on a highway reading - "West Coast Video: 2 miles
ahead at Exit 7" - where West Coast is really located at Exit 8 and
Blockbuster is located at Exit 7. Customers looking for West
Coast's store will pull off at Exit 7 and drive around looking for it.
Unable to locate West Coast, but seeing the Blockbuster store right
by the highway entrance, they may simply rent there. Even
consumers who prefer West Coast may find it not worth the trouble
to continue searching for West Coast since there is a Blockbuster
right there."
The most obvious fault with this analogy as a lens through which to
view the Brookfield case is that surfing the Internet is nothing like driving
on the highway. If clicking the button on a mouse (once to visit a site, once
to exit) is somehow equivalent to being steered onto an unknown road and
driving at least several minutes before being able to correct one's path, it
is difficult to imagine what limit there might be on the Brookfield court's
imagination. In the Brookfield court's analogy, the initial interest
confusion is quite apparent, since the inconvenience of looking for what
one was initially interested in is substantial compared to the convenience
of going with the infringing competitor. In the Internet context, there is
virtually no inconvenience. For sites that are clearly discernible from their
trademark-owning counterpart, the distraction may not even be a few
seconds for the vast majority of Internet users. Also relevant to this point
97. 174 F.3d 1036, 1043 (9th Cir. 1999).
98. Id. at 1053.
99. Id. at 1064.
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are the observations made earlier regarding expectations of Internet users.
If users of search engines are generally skeptical of search results they are
given by a search engine, or if something else in their experience might
cause them to reserve judgment of a website they visit through some
referring mechanism, then the chance that there is likelihood of confusion,
even initial interest confusion, becomes increasingly small.
Lastly, and most importantly, the legal standard set in Brookfleld is a
particularly difficult one to meet for trademark owners. In Brookfleld, it is
clear that the products and services identified by the mark MOVIEBUFF
and the domain name moviebuff.com were nearly and exactly the same.
Lest a trademark owner think this was a fluke, one should be careful to
note that every major initial interest confusion case with an outcome
favorable to the trademark owner has involved litigants having either
identical products and services"° or immediate plans'' to have products
or services identical to the opposing litigant. A very recent decision in
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Doughney, °2 fits
squarely within this trend, both plaintiff and defendant offering the exact
same "product:" political speech concerning animals rights."03 As such, the
holding in Brookfield would not apply to the vast majority of domain name
skirmishes like those found in UDRP disputes, where the domain name
owner has no product or service remotely related to the trademark owner's
products or services. Considering that many cases in the UDRP discussion
above specifically cite the Brookfleld case as support for their position,
there is a clear misunderstanding of the Brooklfield precedent. Brookfield
should not be interpreted as anything more than it is: a case representing
a rare alignment of facts and stretching an already stressed Lanham Act
infringement doctrine to its extremes.

100. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254 (2nd Cir. 1987) (oil
manufacturer and seller v. oil dealer); SecuraComm Consulting, Inc. v. SecuraCom, Inc., 984 F.
Supp. 286 (D.N.J. 1997) (security systems consulting v. security systems consulting); Porsche Cars
N. Am., Inc. v. Manny's Porshop, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 1128 (N.D. II1. 1997) (Porsche maker and
repair v. Porsche repair); Pebble Beach Co., Resorts of Pinehurst, Ind. v. Tour 18 I, Ltd., 942 F.
Supp. 1513, 1552 (S.D. Tex. 1996), aff'd, 155 F.3d 526,48 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1065 (5th Cir. 1998) (golf
course operator v. golf course operator); Blockbuster Entm't Group v. Laylco, Inc., 869 F. Supp.
505 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (video store v. video store); Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co.,
841 F. Supp. 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway
& Sons, 365 F. Supp. 707 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (piano maker v. piano maker).
101. See Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 191, 40 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1021,
46 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1737 (5th Cir. 1998).
102. 113 F. Supp. 2d 915,919 (E.D. Va. 2000), af'd,263 F.3d 359, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS
19028 (4th Cir. 2001).
103. Left for another day is the consideration that this sort of "product," is sufficiently
noncommercial so that confusion analysis should either not apply or apply different than in the
"pure commerce" context. In any event, the PETA case did not require a decision on this point
because it was uncontested that defendant's use was commercial in nature.
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IV. A DYING TRADEMARK LAW
It is natural, as many have done, to see the various expansions of
trademark law discussed herein as positive strides toward fending off such
undesirables as "cybersquatters." Indeed, these concerns have been at the
heart of the strides themselves. But as is sometimes the case, the baby is
easily thrown out with the bathwater. It is long past time to take a critical
look at the effects of these expansions to see what negative influence they
have had on both the law and the public that they ostensibly protect.
There is a fine line across which trademark law lies. The protections
put in place by the Lanham Act, the Federal Dilution Act, and the ACPA
involve, just like other areas of intellectual property, tradeoffs between the
public interest and the rights of parties protected under their coverage.
When trademark owners are given increasingly expansive rights, they
come at a cost to potential competitors as well as consumers who would
benefit from such competition. Thus, it should be alarming that "trademark
law and04its various cousins seem to be expanding against all common
sense."'1

If one believes that, as proposed here, there is a serious problem in the
way courts and UDRP panels are thinking about confusion in the context
of the Internet, then what are the effects? The answer to this question
should not be contemplated until a few relevant facts are pointed out.
Since this Article deals with only one, however important, concern of
federal trademark law, it is surely reasonable to examine how other areas
of trademark law have been changing. Once this context is established, it
will be possible to illustrate some of the many harmful effects that an
expanding trademark law has had on domain name holders.
A. Trademark Law on the Move
Professor Kenneth L. Port summarizes nicely the path of trademark law
over the past several years:
Three major developments have happened in roughly the last
decade. First, in 1988, section 1051 of the Lanham Act was
amended to provide for the reservation of marks which claimants
intend to use in commerce. In 1996, Congress passed the Federal
Dilution statute, which was expanded in 1999 to include dilution as
grounds for cancellation or opposition proceedings before the
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB). Also, but certainly not
104. Wendy Gordon, Ralph Sharp Brown, Intellectual Property, and the Public Interest
(Introduction), 108 YALE L.J. 1611, 1617 (1999).
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finally, in 1999 Congress further amended the Lanham Act to add
a new section 43(d), which provides for statutory damages and in
rem jurisdiction when a cybersquatter registers another's trademark
as its domain name with the intent to traffic in the domain name.
This trend drastically expands the boundaries of what the common
law had long settled as the scope of American trademark right.
None of the existing social, economic, or legal justifications
supporting American trademark law encourage, let alone tolerate,
such expansion .... [T]he social, economic, and legal funlctions of
trademark protection are actually undermined by the expansion."'
Correspondingly, the rights of trademark owners seeking to protect
their name against any use by domain name registrants has been
expanding. As noted in the beginning of this Article, there are several
substantial roadblocks that have at one time or another stood in the way of
trademark owners looking to prevent a domain name registrant from using
their name. First, the Lanham Act has previously required plaintiffs to
demonstrate a defendant's "commercial use in commerce"' 6 of the
trademark in question. Because it is often the case that a challenged
domain name has not been used at all on the Internet, or if it has, not in a
commercial sense, plaintiffs have faced at least a prima facie difficulty in
establishing such use. However, courts have been willing to "stretch the
'commercial use in commerce' requirement to the vanishing point in order
07
to 'catch' cybersquatters."'
In the case of dilution, there is another requirement for a successful
cause of action. Namely, the plaintiff's mark must be famous. The power
of the dilution statute, which requires no likelihood of confusion, is
substantially tempered by this claim. However, as noted earlier, courts
have been willing to expand the definition of "famous" to include some
highly questionable marks.'0 8
The aforementioned roadblocks to trademark protection on the Internet
have become almost moot with the passing of the ACPA. The ACPA,
which provides a cause of action very similar to the protection provided
by the UDRP," explicitly does away with the "commercial use in
commerce" requirement as well as any famousness requirement. As
105. Kenneth L. Port, The Congressional Expansion of American TrademarkLaw: A Civil
Law System in the Making, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 827, 829-31 (2000).
106. Lanham Act § 43(c)(1) (2001); Federal Anti-Dilution Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2001).
107. Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE
L.J. 1687, 1702 (1999) (citing Panavision Int'l v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1324-26 (9th Cir. 1998);
Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. at 1239 (N.D. Ill. 1996)).
108. See infra § III(A)(1).
109. Both are focused on domains "identical or confusingly similar" which are registered with
"bad faith intent," as defined by a list of several factors.
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mentioned before, it is still unclear whether the likelihood of confusion
analysis imputed in the ACPA's application only to domain names
"identical or confusingly similar" will be given full consideration by
courts applying the Act.
So then, we arrive at a situation where, at best, domain name registrants
incorporating a trademark owner's mark, for any purpose, are extremely
dependent upon a proper likelihood of confusion analysis. But, as this
Article has been committed to demonstrating, there is significant reason
to worry that courts have not been applying a confusion analysis that
properly compensates for the nature of Internet technology, the
expectations and behavior of its users, or, consequently, the most basic of
principles underlying trademark law.
The most important issue, though, is not whether trademark law is
systematically being eroded in the context of Internet domain names.
Rather, it is what the public effects of such erosion have been or will be.
In overreaching to "grab" certain egregious cybersquatters, who else have
Congress, the courts, and ICANN caught in their nets and do we really
care about them?
B. Effects
To be sure, there have been many legally questionable registrations of
domain names in the Internet's history. The most infamous
"cybersquatter" is Dennis Toeppen, who registered numerous trademarks
as domain names with a fairly clear intent to sell them back to the
trademark owners. Several of Toeppen's domains were the subject of
federal litigation." 0 Insofar as there is a clear intent to extort funds from
the owners of trademarks, and that there is clearly a likelihood of
confusion, few would argue with the policy behind punishing a true
"cybersquatter." Of course, where there is no likelihood of confusion or a
mark is insufficiently famous for protection under the Federal Dilution
Act, it is not clear what policy grounds support a property right in
trademarks prohibiting any undesired use at all. Moreover, there are
substantial policy reasons against providing such protection. The following
section highlights some of the negative consequences that result, either
directly or indirectly, from the indiscriminate expansion of trademark
rights in the Internet world.
C. Reverse Hijacking, ChillingEffects, and Stealingfrom Babies
The colorful term "reverse domain name hijacking" has been coined to
describe the practice of some trademark owners who have used dubious,
110. See Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227 (N.D. I11.1996); Panavision Int'l, L.P.
v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
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if not outright false, legal claims to challenge domain name registrations
of those who have legitimate trademark or other rights to use such
domains. These sorts of claims are particularly troublesome where there
is a large discrepancy between the parties' economic power. Several
trademark cases have surfaced where the plaintiff's claims seem highly
questionable in light of the confusion critique presented here.
1. NorthernLight Tech. v. NorthernLights Club..
In Northern Light, the plaintiff, Northern Light Technology (NLT)
brought suit against Northern Lights Club (NLC) for NLC's registration
and use of the northernlights.com domain name. NLT has a federal
trademark registration for NORTHERN LIGHT, which it uses to identify
its Internet search engine service. NLC operates an unincorporated
association called the Northern Lights Club and has licensed the
northernlights.com domain to a "vanity" email service that allows users to
purchase email addresses incorporating the domain. NLT has been in
operation since 1995, though its search engine did not come online until
1997. Importantly, defendant NLC had registered its domain name, which
happens to be a widely known astronomical phenomenon, in 1996, well
before plaintiff had ever used its trademark in commerce by deploying its
Internet search engine using the NORTHERNLIGHT name.
The Northern Light case represents a troubling situation. Even though
the defendant had registered its domain name well before the plaintiff's
mark was ever used in commerce,,NLT seeks to recapture a domain name
it knew was taken when it chose to use a similar mark for its service. Quite
obviously, this would be a desirable result for NLT, allowing it to negate
an apparent business blunder in not securing the name when it had
registered its trademark or choosing a different name for its search engine.
Perhaps such a result would be more acceptable from a policy standpoint
if NLC was offering a service that was related to the search engine that
NLT operates. However, the operations of NLC could only be construed
as such with the widest interpretation of the law - so wide as to make
virtually any two entities on the Internet proximate enough in service
offerings to constitute infringement. Obviously, such a result would lead
to a slippery slope of trademark law cases in the Internet domain name
area and simply does not make sense.
The Northern Light case has not yet been decided on the merits,
however the judge has fashioned a unique temporary restraining order in
response to the plaintiff's motion for such. The result of the order is visible
at www.northernlight.com, which now displays links both to the plaintiff's
11I. 97 F. Supp. 2d 96 (D. Mass. 2000), affdbyNorthem Light Tech., Inc. v. Northern Lights
Club, 236 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 2001).
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website and the content of the defendant's site. Though the decision of the
judge in NorthernLight to grant a TRO is questionable under the argument
presented here, the judge in that case should be given credit for attempting
to fashion a temporary remedy that does not completely deprive the
defendant of its domain name. This sort of creativity and concern for all
parties to the litigation is laudable and rarely found in domain name
decisions.
2. Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc."2
At dispute in Hasbrowas the domain name clue.com. Defendant Clue
Computing had registered the domain to use for its website, describing the
Internet and computer consulting services it provides. Hasbro, of course,
is the maker of the popular board game "Clue." A few things are notable
about the clue.com dispute. First, the word "clue" is, like many domain
names, commonly used in the English language. Indeed, it is even
commonly used in commerce, there being at least 273 federally registered
trademarks incorporating the word "clue.""..3 These many uses of the word
"clue" mean that a decision in favor of Hasbro would give it a broad
property right against hundreds, perhaps thousands of otherwise legitimate
users. Of course, trademark law should not, and in this case did not, allow
such a result since either a likelihood of confusion or dilution must be
found in order to give Hasbro the right to stop anyone from using the
clue.com domain name. As to dilution, the Hasbrocourt found that CLUE
was not a famous mark. As for infringement, the Hasbrocourt came to an
extremely obvious conclusion: that board games and computer consulting
services have nothing to do with each other.
Though welcome, the victory of Clue Computing in the Hasbro battle
may not determine the winner of the war between Clue Computing, Inc.
and Hasbro, Inc. The litigating of Hasbro has been an astronomically
expensive venture for Clue, a tiny single employee company. The legal
bills for Clue have resulted in a substantial portion of its revenues for the
years since Hasbro first brought suit in 1987. "' Despite Clue Computing's
victory, victorious defendants in trademark suits are not eligible for either
attorneys' fees or costs. The obvious result of this is that litigation is at
best an expensive and risky proposition for defendants of trademark

112. 66 F. Supp. 2d 117 (D. Mass. 1999), affdbyHasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 232
F.3d 1, 56 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1766 (1st Cir. 2000).
113. See U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Trademark Information, available at http://www.
uspto.gov/web/menu/tm.html (searching the cite for the term "clue" returns 273 trademarks as of
Feb. 1, 2001).
114. See http://www.clue.com/legal/index.html (last visited Feb. 1,2001) ("Legal defense ate
about 25% of our revenue the first year, and for 1997 it was over 50%. 1998 was even worse.").
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infringement claims. Thus, a significant chilling effect operates for domain
name holders who are served with infringement suits or threats of them.
Because there is no official records of demands made by trademark
holders," 5 it is difficult to quantify the number of domain name owners
who have forfeited their rights because of an inability to counter legally
invalid claims. In any event, the number of highly questionable claims that
actually have resulted in recorded litigation is telling. A 1999 study of 121
domain name cases found that "a large majority of the cases (88 percent)
would not qualify as trademark infringement under traditional standards
of case law."' "16 If the claims that actually make it to court are so
overwhelmingly without merit, it seems logical that an even greater
percentage of claims not litigated are meritless." 7 Only those who can
afford the potential costs of a legal battle will last long enough to see a
courtroom.
3. Healthnet.org
Profit driven enterprises are not the only parties trademark owners have
targeted. The California company Foundation Health Systems, an $8.9
billion insurance company, set their sights in 1999 on Satellife, a nonprofit
organization dedicated to providing health information to doctors in
impoverished countries."' Sinde 1993, Satellife has operated its world
wide network using the domain name healthnet.org. Interestingly, when
Satellife had registered its domain name, .org domain names were
understood to be restricted to non-profit organizations. Satellife charges
that the loss of its domain name, which would require changes in servers
across the globe, would "cost more than $1 million to do, and create
considerable confusion.""' 9 Though the healthnet.org dispute is one in
which the litigants have at least facially similar ventures, and thus
confusion is at least more possible than if such were not the case, the
dispute underscores the importance of getting trademark law right. In
expanding the law to reach true "cybersquatters," the effect may be that

115. However, an unofficial project devoted to discovering chilling effects in areas of
intellectual property that touch the Internet is underway at the Berkman Center for Internet and
Society. See http://eon.law.harvard.edu/chill (last visited Dec. 20, 2001).
116. Milton Mueller, Trademarks and Domain Naptes: Property Rights and Institutional
Evolution in Cyberspace(Sharon E. Gillett & Ingo Vogelsang eds., 1999), Proceedings of the 26th
Annual Telecomms. Policy Research Conference, Mahwah, N.J.: LEA Publishers, available at
http://istweb.syr.edul-mueller/studyhp.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2001).
117. Namely, those claims that are found in cease and desist letters by would-be plaintiffs or
which are brought pursuant to UDRP complaints as discussed herein.
118. See Douglas Carnall, HMO Sues Charity Over Domain Name, 172 W.J. MED. 2, (2000),
available at westlaw.com at 2000 WL 1647657.
119. Id.
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parties like Satellife, who may narrowly avoid infringement, are swept
along with them.
4. Private Individuals
Early in the history of domain name litigation, a number of disputes
involving private individuals arose. Publishers of the "Archie" series of
comics, in which one of the characters is named "Veronica," pressured
David Sams, who had registered veronica.org for his infant daughter, to
give up his domain name. 20 Similarly, Prema Toy, Inc., makers of the toy
characters Gumby and his horse Pokey, challenged a young boy
nicknamed "Pokey" who had registered pokey.org for his personal web
site.' 2 ' A more recent example is that of don-henley.com, a site owned not
by musician Don Hugh Henley, but by an individual who is also legally
named Donald (Wayne) Henley. The non-musician Henley uses his site as
a non-commercial venue for his "Christian perspectives." Lawyers for the
musician Henley have repeatedly made demands of Donald Wayne,
site, and
including forfeiture of the domain name, changes to the web
22
deletion of any references on the site to the ongoing dispute. 1

The above examples demonstrate an important principle. Many domain
names are highly susceptible to a number of legitimate uses. This is
especially true for domains consisting of common first or last names,
many of which are also used as trademarks. The more trademark owner
friendly the law becomes, the more persons with domains representing
their names, nicknames, or any other possible source of meaning will be
wrongfully stripped of their rights. As both potential registrants of and
visitors to sites using these domain names, we should worry a great deal
about such a result.
D. UDRP Revisited
Of all the possible forums for the expansion or reduction of trademark
and domain name owners' rights, perhaps the most troublesome are the
dispute resolution tribunals deciding UDRP complaints. UDRP decisions
are far and away the leader, by volume, of such disputes. As of February
26, 2001, over 3,000 UDRP proceedings had been initiated, with over

120. See Karen Kaplan, Archie Comics Drops Its Claimto Veronica.org,L.A. TIMES, Jan. 20,
1999.
121. Id.
122. See Donald Wayne Henley, Don Henley Wants This Domain, available at http://www.
don-henley.com/domain/dispute.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2001).
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5,500 domains in dispute.' 23 More importantly, though, panelists seem to
be significantly biased, both because of their association with an
24
intellectual property protection organization and because of their record.
Indeed, a very recent study by Canadian law professor Michael Geist
shows substantial and widespread pro-complainant bias within the UDRP
system. 125
Interestingly, so far, UDRP panelists have certainly gone the furthest
in deviation from prudent application of trademark principles. As shown
before, the interpretation of recent domain name trademark cases by
UDRP panelists has been seriously lacking analytic rigor and doctrinal
understanding. Furthermore, the UDRP decisions heretofore discussed
have been significantly more implicating of free speech rights than have
domain name cases in federal courts. Not only are the "sucks.com" domain
names intrinsically amenable to use for speech in the form of criticism, but
such names are also significantly more like protected speech in and of
themselves. Whether the name guinness-beer-really-really-sucks.com is
even capable of being used in a trademark sense rather than being only
capable of clear speech use is hardly even debatable. Of course, the UDRP,
unlike federal trademark law, has no apparent requirement that the
complained of domain name be used as a trademark. But given the failing
of UDRP panelists to effectuate provisions of the UDRP that actually do
exist, we should add this questionable doctrinal difference from federal
trademark law to the list of shortcomings of ICANN's dispute resolution
policy.
E. The Relevance of Dilution
Though the focus of this Article is on infringement, it is worth pausing
to consider the relationship between infringement and dilution in the
context of domain name disputes. In particular, the extent and nature of
dilution protection for trademark holders is important to the critique here
because dilution and infringement are complimentary. That is, dilution is
intended to be a remedy where no confusion is likely, but there has still
been a misappropriation of good will of the sort that principles underlying
trademark law would condemn. Thus, it is fair to consider whether the
sorts of domain name disputes discussed here might, while not causing
confusion, still come within the purview of dilution law protection of
trademarks.
123. See ICANN, StatisticalSummary of ProceedingsUnder UniformDomain Name Dispute
Resolution Policy, availableat http://www.icann.org/udrp/proceedings-stat.htm (last visited Feb.
26, 2001).
124. See infra § Ill(B).
125. See Michael Geist, Fair.com?:An Examinationof Systematic Unfairness in the ICANN
UDRP, available at http://aixl.uottawa.ca/-geist/geistudrp.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2001).
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As previously mentioned, noncommercial uses of trademarks are
barred by neither infringement nor dilution law. Thus, where there has
been no commercial use of a mark, dilution cannot provide a remedy for
a trademark owner any more than could infringement. Also as previously
discussed, dilution is substantially harder to show than infringement, since
a trademark owner must prove that its mark is famous. This additional
requirement is extremely important because a dilution claim does not
require a showing of confusion by the trademark owner. As such, owners
of famous marks have a substantial leverage over those who employ their
marks. In practice, the famousness requirement means that many
trademark owners must in fact rely solely on infringement claims to
protect their marks, since their marks are not famous. Thus, any
degradation of the famousness requirement would work as a powerful
force in favor of trademark holders and in the disruption of the delicate
balance between the consumer and producer interests that trademark law
protects.
Because dilution brings trademark law one step closer to giving a true
property right to owners of famous trademarks, it also gravitates toward
offending contrasting rights of others such as those found within the First
Amendment. The Court in L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers,Inc.126 dealt
squarely with the issue of dilution and the First Amendment, finding that
dilution does not escape First Amendment scrutiny entirely. In that case,
the defendant's use of the plaintiff s mark was protected speech regardless
of any protection plaintiff might be due under a Maine trademark law
echoing the federal statute. In the context of domain names, it is worth
considering whether speech sufficient to warrant strong First Amendment
protection could fit within a domain name. Without delving into an
elongated analysis of this question, it should suffice to say that the
examples presented here at least make such a contention probable.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS

If there is anything positive to be gleaned from the current state of
domain name dispute resolution and adjudication, it is that the trouble does
not lie primarily in the existing rules of law. Though written before the
passing of the ACPA, Professor Lemley opined about the problematic
increasing of the rights of trademark owners that, "we do not need new
legal rules here; what we need is the principled and vigorous application
of the old rules.' 27 Indeed, in almost every instance of failure noted here,

126. 811 F.2d 26, 33, 1 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1753 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1013 (Sup. Ct.
1987).
127. See Lemley, supra note 35, at 1713.
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a modification of the applicable laws is not lacking nearly as much as a
proper application of those laws. Likewise is the case for the UDRP,
though there are clearly additional and more severe problems with a
system that does not have any apparent procedures to ensure due process
or systemic integrity through precedent. This section attempts to offer
some more specific suggestions for modifications that courts and ICANN
might make in order to avoid failures leading to the problematic results
above.
A. Courts and FederalTrademarkLaw
An increased judicial understanding and respect for technological and
behavioral norms of the Internet and its users is most critical in improving
adjudication of domain name disputes. Judges should seriously question
claims made by trademark owners that certain uses, or indeed non-uses, of
domain names will result in confusion, mistake, or any other state of mind.
As an initial matter, the evidence seems contrary to the trademark owner's
position. Trademark owners should, therefore, bear the burden of
demonstrating that an alternative state of affairs exist. When the Sleekcraft
factors of confusion do not seem to fit in a particular domain name case,
serious consideration should be given to whether this is a result of an
inadequacy of the law, or the more ockhamistic explanation that the
evidence shows no legal confusion.
None of this is to say that federal courts, in their application of the
relevant trademark law, are incapable of grasping Internet technology with
sufficient ease. In fact, some courts have evidenced a laudable ability to
understand the technical characteristics of the Internet relevant to domain
name disputes. 2 ' However, courts are failing to understand the nexus
between consumers and the Internet. This sort of nebulous information
should be no more ascertainable to a court with specialized technological
expertise, an example being the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
as it is to any other judicial body that has taken the minimal level of time
necessary to understand the case before it. Instead, what is needed is a
commitment by courts to truly penetrate any preconceived notions about
the propriety of a defendant's actions on ostensible policy grounds in order
to effectuate the letter of trademark law and the principles behind it.
Likewise, as Congress adds or modifies existing trademark law, it should
be extremely wary of making laws in a hasty and remedial fashion.
In general, a greater fidelity to a common-sense notion of confusion one that is much more congruent with the traditional motivation for

128. The court in Strick Corp. v. Strickland, 162 F. Supp. 2d 372, No. 00-3343 (E.D. Pa. 2001)
seemed to have a particularly adept grasp of both the technology and law underlying domain name
disputes.
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trademark law - should prevail over competing interpretations of
confusion that undermine such motivations. In the case of initial interest
confusion, there are surely instances where trademark owners may have
viable claims in accordance with principles guiding conventional
trademark law. But those instances will occur where the facts are more like
those in conventional trademark infringement disputes rather than like the
abstruse, embellished versions of confusion presented by some trademark
holders attempting to acquire desired domain names. As for dilution, more
common sense is also necessary. When interpreting concepts like
commercial use in commerce and famousness, it has been argued here,
there is no reason to be more charitable to trademark interests in the
context of domain names than as compared to other contexts.
In considering their decisions, courts should be mindful of the strong
public policy arguments against continued expansion of trademark owners'
rights in the domain name context. Though public policy questions are of
a finite value for judges, there appear to be at least some policy
considerations operating in their decisions to stretch and expand certain
trademark principles to protect trademark owners. This is not surprising in
light of the powerful trademark lobby that plays a part in so much of the
rhetoric attempting to strike terror in the heart of anyone who declines to
vilify the majority of domain name registrations as ruthless
"cybersquatters." Despite these claims, however, there are substantial
arguments against the ever-expanding protections provided to trademark
holders. Most important are speech rights that will undoubtedly be
compromised if trademark holders are able to contravene traditional
trademark law in capturing domain names. Though beyond the scope of
this Article, it is eminently plausible that trademark law, even if facially
neutral, could contravene the First Amendment' 29 if applied improperly by
judges and in response to claims by trademark owners whose motivation
is most certainly the silencing of speech rather than to eliminate confusion
or dilution of its marks. Secondly, competition will be squashed by owners
of trademarks who "leverage" their trademarks to prevent legitimate use
by would-be competitors. Third, are considerations of Internet norms such
as rewarding the notion of "first-come-first-served" that has guided the
DNS since its inception. Lastly, economically powerless users of the
Internet should have just as much right as trademark owners to operate
under easy to remember domain names, assuming they do not truly

129. This is an assertion that certainly deserves more serious consideration. Some courts have
gone so far as to reference First Amendment rights of defendants in domain name disputes, see
Bally Total Fitness HoldingCorp.v. Faber,29 F. Supp. 2d 1161 (C.D. Cal. 1998), but see Planned
Parenthood v. Bucci, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 22179 (2d Cir. 1998), however there is clearly no
agreement in courts or commentary as to when or whether these rights should matter and how much
they should count.
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infringe upon anyone's trademarks. At a minimum, federal law should
provide judicial discretion as to whether a defendant can recoup costs of
a plaintiff's failed suit. None of these considerations would ever or should
ever trump a fair and thoughtful finding of infringement. Instead, they
should be weighed against the arbitrary expansion of trademark rights that
seems to be pervasive in domain name law.
B. ICANN and the UDRP
As mentioned previously, the problems with the UDRP decisionmaking process are both more numerous and more severe than defects in
judicial decision making in federal courts applying trademark law in
domain name cases. Therefore, the changes necessary to correct these
problems are more substantial.
The inability of UDRP panelists, especially those in the WIPO
appointed majority, to apply UDRP rules and trademark principles
imputed by such rules are widespread. Nevertheless, there are several
shining examples of UDRP panelists who have applied the relevant UDRP
rules and trademark laws consistent with their reasonable meaning. For
instance, in the esquire.com decision, a dissenting NAF panelist wrote:
The UDRP is intended to prevent trademark owners from being
extorted by cybersquatters, but it is also intended to protect
legitimate registrations from being threatened by overreaching
trademark owners. A correct application of the spirit and letter of
the UDRP gives each of these concerns equal weight. The majority
opinion fails to balance these concerns. Absent any evidence that
the original registrant was trading specifically on the value of the
Esquire Magazine mark, I cannot conclude that the name was
registered in bad faith.'3 °
Likewise, a WIPO panel found that penguin.org should be kept in the
hands of its original registrant, a young man who had registered the name
to use for his email address and a personal web site, despite ownership of
the PENGUIN trademark of the complainant. The aforementioned
BANCOMPUSA case' also seems to present a decision faithful to the
letter of the UDRP rules and trademark law principles.
A major problem with the UDRP system is that there is no systematic
method of preventing bad decisions from becoming precedent for even
worse decisions. Likewise, the flat non-hierarchical structure of UDRP

130. Hearst Communications, Inc. & Hearst Magazines Prop., Inc., v. David Spencer (NAF
No. FA0093763), available at http://www.arbforum.com/domains/decisions/93763.htm.
131. See supra § III(B)(4).
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panels means that when there are conflicting prior decisions, a panelist is
no more bound to take one over the other. These structural defects only
exacerbate existing problems of partiality and improper application of the
rules. It seems reasonable to expect that until the former problems are
remedied the latter will continue to exist.
ICANN must take a serious look at the results of its UDRP process. It
must examine those results in light of the sorts of critiques contained in
this Article and others. It must consider the possibility of adding at least
some sort of mechanism for appeal. For example, where there has been a
single panelist appointed, there should be an opportunity to appeal to either
a larger panel or some other body of decision making power that ICANN
would create. Because the respondent in UDRP disputes pays panelist fees
only if it elects to have a three-member panel, there is economic pressure
that favors single person panels. If there are drastic economic
discrepancies between complainants and respondents, ICANN has a duty
to determine this and eliminate policies that intrinsically favor one party
over the other, regardless of the merits of the individual case. Such policies
should certainly address what is clearly going on in the area of forum
shopping among UDRP complainants. Though it is uncertain whether
participation of groups like WIPO can even potentially yield equality in
dispute resolution, some consideration should be given to allowing the
respondent the power to either veto or select the resolution forum without
incurring additional expense.
In the alternative to re-hearings by different UDRP panels upon appeal,
ICANN could classify some panelists as appeals panelists. These panelists,
like judges in the United States court system, should be appointed based
on their records of fairness, jurisprudence, and legal skill. As an example,
practicing lawyers for law firms representing trademark owners would be
highly undesirable candidates for such positions. More generally, anyone
who represents or is otherwise financially related to parties who stand to
benefit from precedent generally going one way or another should be
disqualified from appeals decision roles.
To be fair, the UDRP is still in a stage of relative infancy. In time, the
types of procedural safeguards suggested here may very well be
implemented by ICANN. However, the prospects for such possibilities are
poor at the present time. There are clear misinterpretations of both the
UDRP's rules and trademark principles that do not seem to be meeting
much internal resistance within the UDRP system. Moreover, ICANN has
not formally recognized any failings of its system, nor has it made any
effort to study its system beyond the compilation of some very basic
statistics. Surely, a system so pervasive in effect and so problematic in
operation is deserving of higher scrutiny.
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VI. SUMMARY

By any estimation, the most dramatic feature of the Internet is its
tendency for drastic and dynamic change. These changes span both the
technical and social construct of the Internet. It is foolish to think that this
gargantuan force of social, political, economic, and technical change will
be better managed or more easily understood by the legal system than by
any other institution or organization attempting to adapt to it. It is
commonly said that businesses involved with the Internet must operate at
"Internet speed," making incredibly rapid decisions and making their
infrastructure adaptable to immediate change. Lawyers, judges, and others
in the domain name dispute business should be no less nimble and no less
humble. We must seek at all costs to truly understand the inner workings
of the Internet and its user base in order to fashion judgments. We must
expect that precedent may be moot in months instead of years. And we
must be willing to appreciate the many competing policy forces that
interact on the Internet like nowhere else in the world.
Even as this Article is written, drastic changes to the domain name
system are mounting. ICANN has agreed to operate several new top level
domains in addition to .COM, .NET, and .ORG. Many have opined that
the addition of these domains will exponentially exacerbate existing
domain name dispute woes and promising solutions have not been
forthcoming. Compounding the problem is the potential viability of efforts
like those of New.Net,'32 a competing registry of domain names in
competition with ICANN contracted Network Solutions, which provides
technical management of the .COM, .NET, and .ORG registries. New.Net
currently offers twenty top-level domain names different from those
ICANN offers. Of course, in order to visit any New.Net domains, one must
configure one's computer specifically to do so. But New.Net has signed
contracts with several major ISPs and, potentially, could gain enough such
contracts so as to offer a substantial percentage of users on the Internet
seamless access to New.Net domains. Though unlikely, New.Net could
even compete head on with ICANN, offering names ending in .COM and
making it possible for there to be two microsoft.coms, depending on which
ISP a user subscribes to.
Trademark law's fine balance of the public interest and excessive
protection of trademark owners' rights is one that deserves special
attention in light of the dynamic nature of the Internet. In this Article, I
have argued that this attention has not been duly given. The cost of our
failure to accurately reflect the principles behind trademark protection will
be a particularly unsavory Internet - one in which economic power has
risen to be the preeminent factor in the loudness of one's voice. If we are

132. See http://www.new.net.
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to maintain the great power and attraction of a world wide Internet, we
must call for a curtailing of the unnecessary expansion of trademark
owners' rights and the death of trademark principles by which those rights
are achieved.

